Solicitation on Postal Premises: United States v. Kokinda by Larsen, Jay R.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 9
3-1-1992
Solicitation on Postal Premises: United States v.
Kokinda
Jay R. Larsen
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jay R. Larsen, Solicitation on Postal Premises: United States v. Kokinda, 6 BYU J. Pub. L. 199 (1992).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol6/iss1/9
Solicitation on Postal Premises: 
United States v. Kokinda 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whether one considers United States Postal premises a 
public forum or not, solicitating contributions on a postal side-
walk will simply not be allowed. Postal regulations prohibit 
solicitation on postal premises. 1 In United States v. Kokinda,2 
a plurality of the United States Supreme Court held that sec-
tion 232.1(h)(l) did not violate the first amendment's protection 
of free speech.a The Court found that a sidewalk situated en-
tirely on postal premises was a non-public forum and that a 
regulation barring solicitation on such a sidewalk was reason-
able under the circumstances. 
Part II of this note reviews the background, facts, and 
Supreme Court's rationale of Kokinda. Part III then discusses 
specific concerns relating to the public/non-public forum analy-
sis used by the Court and suggests how the Court might have 
avoided this form of analysis. Finally, this note concludes that 
the Court should abandon the public/non-public forum analysis 
and instead apply the traditional time, place, and manner stan-
dard to content-neutral restrictions of protected speech. 
II. THE Kokinda CASE 
A. Background 
The government's reasons for abridging one's freedom of 
speech4 can be placed into two broad categories. The first cate-
1. :39 C.F.R. § 2:32.1(a)-(q) (1990). Section 2:32.1(h)(1) provides, in pertinent 
part: "Soliciting alms and contributions, campaigning for election to any public 
office, collecting private debts, commercial soliciting and vending, and displaying or 
distributing commercial advertising on postal premises are prohibited." 
2. 110 S. Ct. :H15 (1990). 
::1. In Kokinda, Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in which 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia joined. Justice Kennedy 
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting 
opinion in which Justices Marshall and Stevens joined and in which Justice 
Blackmun joined as to Part I. ld. at 3117. 
4. U.S. CoNST. amend. I provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .... " 
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gory is the government's restriction on speech because of its 
content, which Professor Lawrence Tribe describes as govern-
ment action "aimed at communicative impact."5 Professor 
Tribe considers this type of regulation under a theory he labels 
"track one" analysis. 6 Governmental action under "track one" 
analysis takes on a number of different forms. 7 "Track one" 
analysis is typically very rigid. An important general rule 
under track one" is "[ w ]henever the harm feared could be avert-
ed by a further exchange of ideas, governmental suppression is 
conclusively deemed unnecessary."8 When content-based regu-
lations do not fall within one of the traditional "unprotected 
categories,"9 they are subject to strict scrutiny, requiring the 
government to "show that its regulation is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end."10 
The second category of reasons for abridging one's freedom 
of speech involves government restrictions "aimed at noncom-
municative impact but nonetheless having adverse effects on 
communicative opportunity."11 Professor Tribe refers to such 
content-neutral regulations as "track two" analysis. 12 Exam-
ples of content-neutral regulations include prohibiting the use 
Fi. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 790 (2d ed. 1988). 
6. !d. at 791. 
7. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 
(1980) (statute barring the inclusion of inserts that discussed political matters in 
monthly utility bills struck down on the ground that the government may not 
choose which subjects are appropriate for speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (prohibition of 
information about the price of over-the-counter drugs invalidated); Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (conviction of an individual for disturbing the peace due to 
the content of a message on the person's jacket reversed); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923) (ban on the teaching of foreign languages invalid); Debs v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (conviction of an individual who violated a statute 
forbidding one from obstructing the draft or causing military insubordination 
upheld). 
8. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 833-34. 
9. See generally Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990) 
(certain statements of opinion get no special first amendment protection); Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("obscenity is not within the area of 
constitutionally protected speech or press"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. Fi68 (1942) ("fighting words" are among the classes of unprotected speech); 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (incitement of illegal acts constitutes 
an unprotected category). 
10. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 
U.S. 455, 461, 464-65 (1980)). 
11. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 790. 
12. !d. at 792. 
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of sound trucks which emit "loud and raucous noises" while 
operating on the streets, 13 forbidding leaflet distribution to 
prevent littering, 14 and disallowing doorbell ringing when dis-
tributing literature is necessary to protect re~idents from an-
noyance and crime. 15 This note discusses only the second 
category-content-neutral regulation. 
When confronting a governmental action which abridges 
one's freedom of speech, the Court must first determine the 
level of judicial scrutiny to apply to the protected speech regu-
lation.16 Previously, the Court adopted a forum analysis to 
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. 17 If the 
regulation is content-neutral (track two) and the speech occurs 
in a public forum (e.g., public parks, streets, or other property 
expressly or by tradition dedicated to speech activity), then 
strict scrutiny applies. 18 Strict scrutiny requires the regula-
tion to "be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, 
and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must 
be carefully scrutinized."19 Furthermore, under strict scrutiny, 
the regulation must not close "adequate alternative channels 
for communication."20 If the speech activity occurs in a non-
public forum, however, the regulation is subject only to rational 
basis scrutiny.21 
Not all government-owned property is considered a public 
forum. Some government-owned facilities, although public, are 
used for purposes not particularly linked to expression and are 
thus considered non-public fora.22 Previous to the Court's deci-
13. E.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (five-to-four decision upholding 
ban). 
14. E.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking the ban). 
lfi. E.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (plurality opinion, 
four-to-four decision, striking the ordinance because a less restrictive means was 
available). 
16. United States v. Kokinda, l:i.O S. Ct. 3115, :3118 (1990). 
17. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 
(1985) (four-to-three decision with two taking no part in the decision). 
18. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(five-to-four decision). 
19. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980). 
20. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 992. 
21. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (the regulation must be "reasonable and not an effort 
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view"). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (a courthouse and its 
grounds have not been traditionally open for expressive activities and are therefore 
not a public forum); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic 
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (recognizing that the "First Amendment does not 
guarantee access tu property simply because it is owned or controlled by the 
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sion in Kokinda, a conflict existed among the various United 
States Courts of Appeals concerning the status of sidewalks on 
Postal Service property.:!3 
B. Facts of Kokinda 
Volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee 
set up a table on a post office sidewalk "to solicit contributions, 
sell books and subscriptions to the organization's newspaper, 
and distribute literature addressing a variety of political is-
sues.":!4 The sidewalk is the only path to the front doors of the 
post office from the parking lot and lies entirely on Postal Ser-
vice property.25 After receiving between forty and fifty com-
plaints, the postmaster asked the volunteers to leave.26 They 
refused and were arrested.27 
Respondents were convicted of violating 39 C.F.R. § 
232.1(h)(l) by a United States Magistrate in the District of 
Maryland and received modest fines and imprisonment.28 
Respondents appealed to the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland, which affirmed their convictions.29 
Their convictions, however, were reversed by a divided panel of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.30 
The Fourth Circuit held that the postal sidewalk was a public 
forum and that no significant governmental interest was served 
by banning solicitation.:n Because of conflicting decisions 
among the federal courts of appeals, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.32 
government"); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (sidewalks and streets on a 
military base may he placed off limits to political speakers since the purpose of a 
military base is to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum). 
2.3. United States v. Belsky, 799 F.2d 148.5 (11th Cir. 1986) (non-public); United 
States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 64.3 (.3d Cir. 1986) (non-public). But see United States v. 
Kokinda, 866 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1989) (public), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. :3115 (1990). 
24. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 8115, 8117-18 (1990). 
25. ld. at :3118. 
26. Id. 
27. ld. 
2H. Kokinda received a $50 fine and 10 days in prison. Pearl received a $100 
fine and 80 days imprisonment. United States v. Kokinda, 866 F.2d 699, 700 (4th 
Cir. 1989), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 8115 (1990). 
29. ld. at 701. 
::10. ld. at 700. 
:n. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. ::1115, :H18 (1990). 
:j2, ld. 
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C. The Plurality's Reasoning 
The Court first determined whether the postal sidewalk 
was a public or non-public forum. Finding it to be a non-public 
forum,33 the plurality applied a minimum scrutiny (reason-
ableness) analysis and found the regulation to pass constitu-
tional muster.34 
1. Postal premises as a non-public forum 
The Court rejected the argument that despite being on 
postal premises, the sidewalk is indistinguishable from the 
municipal sidewalk on the opposite side of the parking lot.35 
The mere fact that the property in question was a sidewalk 
does not dictate forum analysis.36 A municipal sidewalk run-
ning parallel to a road is a public passageway and therefore a 
traditional public forum sidewalk.37 The Postal Service side-
walk merely gave persons engaged in postal business access to 
the post office building.38 
Continuing its analysis, the Court found that the postal 
sidewalk had not been dedicated to any "expressive activity."39 
The Court pointed out that postal premises are only dedicated 
to "the posting of public notices on designated bulletin 
boards."40 However, the Court recognized that other first 
amendment activities had been permitted on postal proper-
ty.41 Nevertheless, the Court stated that the existence of a 
regulation prohibiting disruption42 and the allowance of some 
:n !d. at :3121. 
34. Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, fimnd that it was unnecessary to 
determine whether the sidewalk was a public or non-public forum, since the postal 
regulation at issue met the traditional standards applied to time, place, and 
manner restrictions. !d. at 3125; see also infra part III.B. 
as. !d. at :n2o. 
36. !d. 
37. !d. 
3R. !d. 
39. !d. at 3121. 
40. !d. (citing 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(o) (1990). 
41. !d. ("To be sure, individuals or groups have been permitted to leaflet, 
speak, and picket on postal premises .... "). 
42. 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(e) (1990) provides, in pertinent part: "Disorderly conduct, 
or conduct which creates loud and unusual noise, or which obstructs the usual use 
uf entrances ... , stairways, and parking lots, or which otherwise . . . impedes 
or disturbs the general public in transacting business or obtaining the services 
provided on property, is prohibited." 
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speech activities did "not add up to the dedication of postal 
property to speech activities."43 Thus, even though the forum 
in Kokinda was not a purely non-public forum because it had 
been dedicated to some expressive activity, the Court held that 
"regulation of the reserved non-public uses would still require 
application of the reasonableness test."44 
2. Reasonableness of the postal regulation 
Having determined that the postal sidewalk in question 
was a non-public forum, the Court then applied the minimum 
scrutiny standard. Under this standard, the regulation not only 
must be reasonable45 but also must not be "an effort to sup-
press expression merely because public officials oppose the 
speaker's view."46 
The Postal Service has regulated solicitation for yearsY 
An important reason for finding the regulation at issue to be 
reasonable48 was that "[t]he purpose of the forum in this case 
[ wa]s to accomplish the most efficient and effective postal deliv-
ery system"49 possible. The Court reasoned that the disruption 
and delay caused by solicitation was a significant enough inter-
ference with "Congress' mandate to ensure the most effective 
and efficient distribution of the mails" to enable the Postal 
Service to regulate such solicitation.50 
43. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121; see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local 
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983) ("selective access does not transform 
government property into a public forum"). 
44. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121. 
45. "The Government's decision to restrict access to a non-public forum need 
only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limi-
tation." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808 
(1985) (emphasis in original). 
46. !d. at 800 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46). 
47. The Court recites a history of postal regulation of solicitation since 1958, 
when "internal guidelines 'strictly prohibited' the '[s]oliciting (of] subscriptions, 
canvassing for the sale of any article, or making collections . . . in buildings 
operated by the Post Office Department, or on the grounds or sidewalks within the 
lot lines' of postal premises." Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3122 (quoting Postal Service 
Manual, Facilities Transmittal Letter 8, Buildings Operation: Buildings Operated by 
the Post Office Department § 622.8 (1958)). The Postal Service gradually created 
various exceptions to its ban on solicitation until it became unmanageable. The 
Postal Service decided that a categorical ban on solicitation was again necessary. 
"Finally, in 1978, the [Postal) Service promulgated the regulation at issue here." 
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3122. 
48. !d. at 3125. 
49. !d. at 3122. 
50. !d. at 3124. 
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3. The regulation found to be content-neutral 
The Court held the regulation to be a categorical ban on 
solicitation and thus content-neutral.51 The Court recognized 
that "[n]othing suggests the Postal Service intended to discour-
age one viewpoint and advance another . . . . By excluding 
all . . . groups from engaging in [solicitation] . . . the Postal 
Service is not granting 'one side of a debatable public ques-
tion . . . a monopoly in expressing its views."'52 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court's use of public/non-public forum analy-
sis may not have been necessary to validate the postal regula-
tion at issue. The Court could have achieved a similar result by 
applying the traditional standards of time, place, and manner 
restrictions. 53 By applying these restrictions, the Court could 
have avoided the forum labeling that has and will probably 
continue to be the source of much controversy. 54 
A. Non-public Forum Analysis 
1. Development of public I non-public forum doctrine 
The public forum doctrine found its genesis in a line of 
cases decided during the 1930s and 1940s.55 During the 1930s, 
streets, sidewalks, and parks were recognized as the clearest 
examples of a completely public forum. 56 
During the mid-1960s, university students were convicted 
of trespassing for having engaged in a demonstration on jail-
house grounds to protest the arrest of fellow students who had 
51. ld. at 3124-25. 
52. ld. (quoting Monterey County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. United States 
Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted)). 
53. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 517 (1979). 
54. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public 
Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 1219 (1984); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The 
History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987); Geoffrey 
R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987). 
55. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 986 n.2. 
56. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("use of 
the streets and public places [for assembly and debate of public questions] has, 
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties 
of citizens"). 
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sought to desegregate public theaters.57 In Adderley v. Flori-
da, the Supreme Court upheld the trespass ·convictions.58 In 
doing so, the Court returned to pre-Hague v. Committee for 
Industrial Organization59 emphasis on the government as a 
private property owner with the "power to preserve the 
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated."60 Adderley laid the foundation for the non-public 
forum doctrine. 
The doctrine "emerged as a fully viable creation as a group 
of decisions in the 1970s."61 In Perry Education Association v. 
Perry Local Educators' Association,62 the Supreme Court set 
out three types of forums. The first type is the "quintessential 
public forum, [such as] streets and parks [that] by long tradi-
tion or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and 
debate .... "63 The second type is the semi-public forum, "con-
sist[ing] of public property which the State has opened for use 
by the public as a place for expressive activity."64 Examples of 
the second type include libraries,65 schools,66 and fair-
grounds.67 The third type is "[p]ublic property which is not by 
tradition or designation a forum for public communica-
tion .... "68 To determine the appropriate level of judicial 
scrutiny, the courts must first categorize the property in ques-
tion. 
57. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
58. ld. at 48. 
59. Hague, 307 U.S. 496 (recognizing a right of minimum access to a public 
forum for speech purposes). Prior to Hague, the Court did not recognize a right of 
access to public places for free speech purposes since it viewed the government as 
a private property owner with the right to exercise domain over its property. 
60. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47. 
61. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 986. 
62. 460 u.s. 37 (1983). 
63. ld. at 45. 
64. ld. 
65. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (Fortas, J., plurality) 
(reversing a conviction of black civil rights demonstrators who protested segregated 
library conditions by quietly sitting-in at the library). 
66. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding an 
anti-noise ordinance prohibiting noise or interference while classes were in session 
so that the basic educational function of the school was not disturbed). 
67. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 
U.S. 640 (1981) (holding that the Minnesota State Fair is a limited public forum 
and distinguishing it from traditional public forums like streets and parks). 
68. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. :37, 46 (1983). 
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2. Appropriateness of the non-public forum doctrine 
As previously mentioned, the standard used to examine 
non-public forum restrictions on protected speech is that of 
minimum scrutiny. In addition, the regulation in question may 
not "suppress expression merely because public officials oppose 
the speaker's view."69 Applying this standard, the Court has 
upheld restrictions on access to military bases, 70 restrictions 
refusing to allow political candidates to advertise on city bus-
es,71 restrictions banning the placement of unstamped mail in 
home mailboxes, 7'1. restrictions denying access to a school's in-
ternal mail system,73 and restrictions excluding political advo-
cacy groups from participating in a federal employee charity 
fund drive. 74 In fact, no one has successfully challenged gov-
ernment regulation of a non-public forum. This is most likely 
because the reasonableness standard is an extremely low stan-
dard to satisfy. In contrast, strict scrutiny provides a standard 
"'strict' in theory, but usually 'fatal' in fact."75 
Given a lower level of scrutiny for non-public fora, 
categorizing the property becomes extremely important. The 
Court has increasingly emphasized governmental intent. 76 Un-
less the public property falls into a traditional public forum, 77 
it may become a public forum only by governmental designa-
tion as a suitable place for general or limited expression. 78 
69. !d. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 
4ii:i U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)). 
70. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985); Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 
828 (1976). 
71. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
72. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 
114 (1981). 
n. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. :37 (1983). 
74. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
75. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 n.6 (1984) (quoting Gerald Gunther, 
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAHV. L. REV. 1, 8 
(1972)). 
76. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. 
77. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) ("streets, sidewalks, and 
parks, are considered, without more, to be 'public forums'"). 
78. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., Justice 
Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion, argues that the Court effectively reduced the 
three categories of general public forum, limited public forum, and non-public 
forum into two categories. He stated: 
The Court makes it virtually impossible to prove that a forum restricted 
to a particular class of speakers is a limited public forum. If the Govern-
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This would be true even where public access would not be in-
compatible with the primary function of the place. Arguably, 
the solicitation of funds outside the post office building, 
whether on the street, sidewalk, or the sidewalk leading to the 
building, would not be incompatible with or interfere with the 
functioning of the post office itself. The public forum doctrine 
has perhaps been formulated and reformulated to the point of 
becoming manipulative and problematic. 
a. Manipulation of the definition of 'public forum." The 
Court appears from time to time to ''have circumscribed the 
category of 'traditional' public forums by focusing on appear-
ance rather than function-on whether the place looks like a 
forum for expressive activity rather than on whether it does in 
fact serve as a significant medium of communication."79 In 
United States v. Grace,S0 the Court struck down a prohibition 
of expressive activity on sidewalks, relying "more on imagery 
than on the functional importance" of the sidewalks around the 
Supreme Court building and grounds. 81 The Court pointed out 
that "[t]here is no separation, no fence, and no indication what-
ever to persons stepping from the street to the curb and side-
walks that serve as the perimeter of the Court grounds that 
they have entered some special type of enclave."82 
Similarly, as Justice Brennan argues in his dissent, the 
sidewalk at issue in Kokinda could also be regarded as a public 
forum rather than a non-public forum. "[S]treets, sidewalks, 
and parks, are considered, without more, to be 'public 
forums."'83 The sidewalk at issue, like other sidewalks, acts as 
a public thoroughfare and 
[f)or the most part, on streets and sidewalks, including the 
ment does not create a limited public forum unless it intends to provide 
an "open forum" for expressive activity, and if the exclusion of some 
speakers is evidence that the Government did not intend to create such a 
forum . . . no speaker challenging denial of access will ever be able to 
prove that the forum is a limited public forum. The very fact that the 
Government denied access to the speaker indicates that the Government 
did not intend to provide an open forum for expressive activity, and un· 
der the Court's analysis that fact alone would demonstrate that the forum 
is not a limited public forum. 
473 U.S. at 825 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
79. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 994 (emphasis in original). 
80. 461 U.S. 171 (1983). 
81. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 995. 
82. Grace, 461 U.S. at 180. 
83. ld. at 177. 
199] UNITED STATES V. KOKINDA 209 
single-purpose sidewalk at issue here, communication be-
tween citizens can be permitted according to the principle 
that "one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left 
open to the public carries with him as elsewhere the constitu-
tional right to express his views in an orderly fashion."84 
Accordingly, Justice Brennan would have held the postal side-
walk to be a public forum. 85 In addition, strict scrutiny would 
have been applied, which would have meant the end of the 
postal regulation at issue. 
b. Labeling and first amendment values. Akin to the 
manipulation problem,86 another potential danger of 
public/non-public forum analysis applied by the Court in this 
case is the disposition of free speech cases through labeling. By 
invoking the non-public forum label, the Court is able to hide 
its first amendment value choices that led to either granting, 
denying, or limiting access to public property. A case-by-case 
interest balancing approach may be more desirable than the 
public/non-public forum analysis. In Kokinda, a balancing ap-
proach may not have produced a different result, but it would 
have allowed a more candid evaluation of the competing values. 
The "public forum" language seems to be used at times by the 
Court to "signal conclusions it has reached on other 
grounds .... "87 Instead, it may have been 
more helpful if the Court were to focus more directly and 
explicitly on the degree to which the regulation at issue im-
pinges on the first amendment interest in the free flow of 
information; [whereas] translating this inquiry into public 
forum language may simply "confuse[] the development of 
first amendment principles."88 
B. Traditional Time, Place, and Manner Standard 
Public forum analysis is not necessary to find the postal 
regulation constitutional. As Justice Kennedy stated in his 
84. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3128 (1990) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943)). 
85. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3129. 
86. See supra text accompanying notes 79-85. 
87. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 993. 
88. !d. (quoting Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of 
Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 
VA. L. REV. 1219, 1223 (1984)). 
210 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
concurrence: 
It is not necessary, however, to make a precise determi-
nation whether this sidewalk and others like it are public or 
non-public forums; in my view, the postal regulation at issue 
meets the traditional standards we have applied to time, 
place, and manner restrictions of protected expression. 
"[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose 
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of pro-
tected speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, 
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for com-
munication of the information."'89 
1. Justified without reference to the content of the speech 
The plurality stated that "[c]learly the regulation does not 
discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint."90 This is 
true because the categorical ban is on all solicitation and does 
not pick and choose among speakers.91 Since the regulation 
does not refer to the content of the regulated speech, reason-
able restrictions on time, place, and manner may be im-
posed.92 
2. Narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest 
The regulation at issue in this case only prohibits "person-
al solicitations on postal property for the immediate payment of 
money."93 Anyone is allowed to participate in other forms of 
expressive activity such as political discussions or distributing 
literature which solicits support and/or contributions, "provided 
there is no in-person solicitation for payments on the 
premises."94 
89. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 8115, 8125-26 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (citations 
omitted). 
90. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 8124. 
91. Justice Brennan contends that the regulation is not content-neutral since it 
is directly tied to what is said. "If a person on postal premises says to members of 
the public, 'Please support my political advocacy group,' he cannot be punished. If 
he says, 'Please contribute $10,' he is subject to criminal prosecution. His punish-
ment depends entirely on what he says." ld. at 8184 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 4-10. 
98. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at :3126 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
94. ld. 
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The government has a significant "interest in reducing 
congestion and maintaining the flow of traffic on access walk-
ways leading to its facilities and in protecting postal patrons 
from unnecessary distractions or impediments to the conduct of 
their business.'>95 Also, Congress has mandated for the Postal 
Service the goal of being financially self-sufficient.96 In order 
to accomplish this goal, it is important for the Postal Service to 
effectively compete with private-sector businesses providing 
similar services. Therefore, the Postal Service should be able to 
prevent interference and annoyance of its customers, as well as 
provide a quiet, businesslike setting where patrons may obtain 
the services they are seeking.97 Solicitation is different from 
other forms of conduct in that it is inherently more aggressive, 
more intrusive, and more likely to provoke negative 
reactions. 98 It thus appears that the regulation is drawn suffi-
ciently narrow to serve an important governmental interest. 
3. Ample alternative channels to communicate the information 
Sufficient alternatives existed for respondents to communi-
cate the information they sought to convey. The regulation does 
not prohibit the distribution of literature soliciting contribu-
tions or membership subscriptions.99 Such literature may be 
read later by the postal customer away from the pressure of a 
face-to-face encounter with the solicitor. Nor does it prevent 
such person from moving to the sidewalk adjacent to the street 
95. Brief for the United States at 14, United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 
3115 (1990) (No. 88-2031). 
96. Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (codified as 
amended at 39 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)). 
97. Brief for the United States at 14-15, United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 
3115 (1990) (No. 88-20~H). 
98. In Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 
640 (19R1), Justice Blackmun noted the following distinction about solicitation: 
The distribution of literature does not require that the recipient stop in 
order to receive the message the speaker wishes to convey; instead, the 
recipient is free to read the message at a later time . . . . [S]ales and 
the collection of solicited funds not only require the fairgoer to stop, but 
also "engender additional confusion . . . because they involve acts of 
exchanging articles for money, fumbling for and dropping money, making 
change, etc." 
ld. at 665 (Biackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Inter-
national Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 87 (Todd, 
J., dissenting in part)). 
99. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3126 (1990). 
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to engage in the personal solicitation of immediate contribu-
tions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court held that section 232.l(h)(l) of the 
United States postal regulations, 100 prohibiting soliciting, 
electioneering, collecting debts, vending, and advertising, did 
not violate the first amendment's protection of free speech. In 
doing so, the Court used the public/non-public forum analysis 
and found the postal sidewalk to be a non-public forum. The 
Court accordingly applied the minimum scrutiny standard and 
found the regulation to be reasonable under the rational basis 
test. The use of the public forum analysis, however, is some-
what troubling. As applied, the Court may either manipulate 
the definition of public forum or simply label government prop-
erty as a non-public forum and thereby not only examine the 
regulation in question under the lowest level of scrutiny but 
also effectively hide its first amendment value choices. While 
possibly true that many areas of law require manipulation and 
labeling to reach "fair" results, such devices may also be used 
in cases which reach seemingly "unfair" results. The continued 
use of the public/non-public forum analysis on areas of first 
amendment protection has and will provoke considerable criti-
cal commentary. Such critical thought and commentary is im-
portant to our legal system in promoting change. Perhaps the 
time has come for the Court to not be so concerned with 
whether a forum is public or non-public in content-neutral 
cases but to simply apply the traditional time, place, and man-
ner standard to content-neutral restrictions of protected speech. 
Jay R. Larsen 
100. 89 C.F.R. §§ 2:32.1(a)-(q) (1990). 
